INTRODUCTION
A BASIC INGREDIENT of the theory of competitive analysis is the concept of a continuous, monotone, convex preference relation (see Debreu [4] , Arrow-Hahn [I] ). It is assumed in the theory that economic agents (to be specific, consumers) are endowed with one such and that they behave in competitive markets situations, i.e., when facing parametric prices, by choosing preferred points in budget sets. The demand function or, more generally, correspondence thus generated contains all the relevant information about the behavior of the consumer (setting aside how its income is determined).
Suppose now that the demand function is known, say, by means of market observations, and that we want either to predict the behavior of the consumer in some noncompetitive situation, or to make some definite welfare statement. Is this possible? For the question to be meaningful we should assume that underlying the given demand function there is a preference relation; to get to the heart of the matter, we shall postulate that there is a continuous, monotone, convex one. The problem can then be formulated thusly: does the given demand function identify uniquely a monotone, convex, continuous preference relation? It turns out that, in spite of its intuitive plausibility, such a contention is false. There are two distinct continuous, monotone, strictly convex preference relations, defined in the nonnegative orthant of ~' ( 1 a 2) , giving rise to identical demand functions. Needless to say, they are very pathological.
This negative result poses the problem of determining a wide enough class of preferences having what could be denominated the recoverability property. It leads us to define, in a certain natural manner, a class of "lipschitzian" preference relations. It can be characterized (Theorem 1) as the class of preferences representable by utility functions which are lipschitzian and satisfy a further, quite weak, regularly condition (akin to the "nonvanisliing of the gradient vector"). Once this representability result is available it is proved (Theorem 2) that the recoverability property holds for lipschitzian preference relations.
From the work of Houthakker [12] and Uzawa [IS] it is known that continuous preferences yielding income lipschitzian demand functions (this concept will be defined precisely later on) are recoverable. It is proved (Theorem 3) that those preferences are lipschitzian, in our sense. The converse is not true; in particular, smooth (Cr, r a 1; see Debreu [S] ) and concavifiable (i.e., representable by concave utility functions) preferences are lipschitzian but they do not necessarily give rise to income lipschitzian demand functions. It would appear that the class of lipschitzian preferences is quite broad and includes as proper subsets most of the classes of preferences useful in applications. Thus, while avoiding pathology, virtually no conceptual generality will be lost by confining oneself to a lipschitzian preferences setup.
RESULTS

A. Some Definitions and a Fact
The consumption set will be 0 = {x E R': x 3 0 1 .~ Every proof, and therefore every result, in this paper remains valid if 0 is interpreted to be the strictly positive orthant R:+.
A complete preorder 2 on o3will be called a preference relation. For every Z a n d x E 0 let V(Z,x)={y €0:y Z x } ; x > y means i ( y Z x ) .
A preference relation 2 is: (i) upper semicontinuous (u.s.c.) if V(2, x ) is closed for every x ;(ii) continuous on A c0 if its graph is closed in A x A ; (iii) continuous if it is continuous on 0 ; (iv) convex if x 2 y implies tx + (1-t)y Z y for every t E [0, 11; (v) strictly convex if it is convex and x > y implies tx + (1-t)y > y for every t E (0, 11; (vi) monotone, if x >> y implies x > y ; (vii) strictly monotone, if x > y implies x > y.
The set of continuous, convex, monotone preference relations will be denoted P ; Psc(resp. PSm) is the subset of strictly convex (resp. strictly monotone) ones.
Given an u.s.c. preference relation 2 the demand correspondence hk: R -,0 for 2 is defined as usual, i.e., h2(p, w ) = {x : px c w, and py 6 w implies x Z y}; if 2 is strictly convex, then h k is a function.
The following fact shows the inadequacy of the continuity assumption for extracting welfare conclusions out of the analysis of consumers' behavior in competitive markets. It should be regarded as the main motivation for this paper.
FACT: There are two continuous, monotone, strictly convex preference relations 2 , 2' such that 2 # 2' and h Z = hk', i.e., there is a continuous, monotone, strictly convex preference relation which is not recoverable from its demand function.
REMARK 1: Although the prevailing opinion in the literature seems to be the contrary (see, for example, Gorman [9, (iv), p. 1041) the possibility described by the just stated fact has been previously recognized by T. Rader [16, p. 2431, L. Shapley and, no doubt, others. R ; + = { X E R " : X > > O ) . A complete preorder 2 on R is a subset of R x R which is reflexive (i.e., x k x, for every x E R ) , transitive (i.e., x 2 y, y 2 z implies x Z z ) , and complete (i.e., for every x, y E R , either x k y or y k x ) . A systematic analysis of the lipschitzian preferences concept shall not be attempted here since the focus of this paper is the recoverability property. In this form it is clear that the concept of lipschitzian preferences is not new; it has been introduced before by Rader under the name of uniformly sensitive preferences [16, p. 1711;~ it is also closely related (but, naturally enough, weaker) to a condition isolated by Moulin [14] for the purpose of characterizing preferences representable by C' utility functions with no critical point. REMARK 7: The definition given for regularity of utility functions requires that the function be strictly increasing; indeed, Theorem 1 is obviously false if strict convexity is replaced by convexity in its statement. Let k be a monotone (not necessarily strictly) preference relstion and u a utility function for 2;then an appropriate definition of regularity is: u is regular if for every r >0 there is 6 >0 such that if x E K, and A >0, then u (x +he) -u (x) 3 &A. With this definition, and no further complication in the proof, Theorem 1 remains true for convex (not necessarily strictly) preferences.
Theorem 1 is also related to a theorem of his [16, p. 1721. REMARK 8: Let % be the set of utility functions for preferences in P and denote by @: % + P the map which assigns to every u the preference relation it represents. Say that a set P'c P(resp. % ' c %) is uniformly lipschitzian if, for every r >0 and 2 E Pt(resp.u E %I), the maps V,, (resp. ujK,) admit a common lipschitz constant (so, for example, the set formed by a single Cobb-Douglas utility function is not uniformly lipschitzian).
Define the uniform regularity of % ' c 011 analogously, but with respect to the notion of regularity of Remark 7. The counterpart of Theorem 1 (which is proved in exactly the same manner) is the following:
THEOREM1': A set P'c P is uniformly lipschitzian if and only if there is a uniformly lipschitzian and regular set %' c % such that @(%I) = 9'. Endow P with the closed convergence topology considered by Hildenbrand [ll] . It can be seen that this topology is equivalent to the one induced by the uniform convergence of the function V,,, (i.e., 2,, + 2 if, for all r, V z , ,+ V2,, uniformly). Theorem 1' has then an interesting implication: if P' c P is uniformly lipschitzian, then it is relatively compact. Indeed, let % ' c % be as in Theorem 1'; with the compact open topology on %, @ is continuous (see Mas-Cole11 [13, 1.181); because %' is a uniformly lipschitzian and regular set, it has a limit point u in % and, therefore, @ ( u ) is a limit point of 9' in P. Since any subset of P' is again uniformly lipschitzian this proves the relative compactness of 9'.
Compact sets of continuous preferences play an important role in the theoretical study of large economies (see Hildenbrand [ I l l , Bewley [3] ). REMARK 9: All the definitions have been given in terms of a specific collection of compact cubes in R ' ; Theorem 1 remains true if we had used the collection of compact, convex subsets of R:+ with nonempty interior.
C. Lipschitzian Preferences and the Recoverability Property
The relevance of lipschitzian preferences for the problem of this paper stems from the following theorem: REMARK 12: Let 2 be a preference relation. It is said that x € 0is revealed preferred (r.p.) to y E 0 if for some (pi, wi) E RLY, i = 1, .. .,N, one has x E h"(pl, wl), p~y sWN, y& h Z ( p~, WN) and? for all i <N, pixi+ls wi for some xi+lE h(pi+1, w~+~) .
The following is a corollary of Theorem 2:
If 2 is continuous, lipschitzian, monotone, and convex, then x is revealed preferred to y if and only if x >-y.
PROOF: The "only if" part is trivial. Let y E 0 ; denote Ty ={z E 0:y is not r.p. to z); it is easily checked that Ty is closed and convex. Define a new preference relation 2' by: v) ) and v@ T,," or "U E Tyn V(2, v) and v E T,." Then 2' is upper semicontinuous, monotone, convex, and h z = hz'. By Theorem 2', 2' = 2 , but this is possible only if Ty= V(2, y ).
Q.E.D.
From the revealed preference literature (Houthakker [12] , Uzawa [18] ) it is known that continuous preferences giving rise to demand functions satisfying a certain income lipschitz condition are recoverable. We will prove that those preferences are lipschitzian in our sense. DEFINITION: Let 2 be continuous, monotone, and strictly convex ;h Z is income lipschitzian if, for every compact L CR:+,', there is a real H such that if (p, w), (p, w') EL, then IJhz(p, w) -hZ(p, w')IJs H~W -w'l.
THEOREM3:Let Z be a continuous, monotone, strictly convex preference ;if h is income lipschitzian, then 2 is lipschitzian.
Let Pil=(2E Psc: h z is income lipschitzian). Then Theorem 3 says PilcP i ; the converse inclusion does not hold. We already pointed out that PC, cPi and Pdc PI.In fact, none of the sets Pi!, PC,, Pd is contained in the union of the remaining two; this is well known for Pd and Examples 2 and 3 will show, respectively, that Pil@ Pco, Pco @ Pii.So, the set of lipschitzian preferences contains as proper subsets the classes of preferences defined by the regularity properties stronger than continuity which have proved most fruitful. We may remark that the intersection Pi,n PC, nP d contains the set of c2preferences having indifference hypersurfaces with everywhere nonzero curvature (see Debreu [5] , Fenchel [7, Ch. 81, Aumann [2] ) and is therefore dense in P with respect to the closed convergence topology (see Mas-Cole11 [13] ).
REMARK13: Theorems 1 and 3 have obvious implications in revealed preference theory. To keep the length of this paper within bounds they shall be developed elsewhere.
PROOF OF THE THEOREMS
For any monotone, convex preference relation Z define a correspondence u ( 2 ,.) ( 2 , x,), p, +p. If i ( x Z y ) , then i ( x , 2 y ) for n larger than some N, hence p,y >p,x, and so py a p x ; monotonicity implies then py s p x for any y E V ( 2 ,x ) .
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Pick 2 E PSc and f >1.This 2 and f will remain fixed for the rest of the proof. If
x Z y and y Z x, we write x -y. We denote VKiby Vi. intersects the closed segment connecting y ' and Fe.
Q.E.D.
We are ready for the proof of the theorem. 
PROOF:
Let p E (+(2z1, x) and suppose that y k2X, py <px. By monotonicity we can assume -I(X k2y). Let p >> 0 be such that@ >px for every z E V(k2, y); it is clear that such a p exists. Pick a t E (0, 1) such that, letting p, = tp +(1 -t)p, pry <p,x ;note that p, >> 0. Take v E hz2(p, ptx); then v E V(k2, y) and so pu >px. Since p,v =p,x, we have pv <px which implies u& V(Zl, x) and, therefore, v& h %'(P,, p,x). Since this is impossible, we conclude p E (+(2z2, x) .
Let k l , 2 2 be two u.s.c., convex, monotone preference relations and suppose that k1is representable by a lipschitzian utility function u : 0+R.
For every x E 0 define I, = (y : y E V ( t 2 , X) and if y' < y, then i ( y l 22x)}.
Because of monotonicity (and u.s.c.) in order to establish k1= k 2 , it suffices to prove that, for every x E int 0 , V(Zz, x) c V(Z1, x), or, simply, I, c V(Z1, x). Hence, let x E int 0 , y E I, ; we will show u (y) 3 u (x).
Since I, is contained in the boundary of the convex set V(Z2, (7)); hence, for every n (remember z,, f (i) E int 01, u(zn) s~(f(i)), i.e., u(zn) s g ( i ) . Therefore,
which contradicts the fact that u is lipschitzian (since zn +f (i), f (t,) +f (S), the sequences f (t,), zn can eventually be enclosed in a compact subset of int 0 ) . We conclude that gl(t) 3 0 a.e. and so u (y ) -u (x) = gl(s) ds 3 0.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Let Z E PSc be such that h" is income lipschitzian. We shall show, and this will end the proof, that for every p E s:: the utility function M, = M(p, is lipschitzian and regular.
a)
Pick an arbitrary p E s :
: and let K c int 0 be any compact set. Then the set 
,) and (M(pL, x,) -M(P;, y,))/(M(p,, x,) -
M(p,, y,)) +co. For every n and t E [O, 11 let p, ( t ) = tp; + ( 1-t)p, E J and define g,: [O, ll+ (0, a) by gn(t) =M(p,(t), xn)-M(pn(t), Y,). Then gn(l)/gn(0)+a and, by (ii), the functions g, are c'. Let c, =sup,g;(t)/g,(t). Since log g, ( 1 )-log g(O)= (gL(t)/g, ( t ) ) dt c, and log (g,(l)/g,(O))-+ a, one has c, + co. Therefore there is t, E [O, 11, such that g;(t,)/g, (t,) +m .
Denote pn =p,(t,) E J, v;=p(&, x,), v, =p(p,, Y,), wL=M(Fn, x,), wn =
M(p,,y,). Note that v , f v L and l / s~w , < w~s s .
By (ii), gL(t,)= (pk-p,)(vL-v,), g,(t,)=&(vL-v,). Therefore (pL-pn)(~k-vn)lD(v;-vn)+ co which implies (Ilv;-v, Il/pn(vL-v,))((pL -pn)(vL -vn)/(lvh-vnll) +00. Since, for every n, (pL-p,)(vL-v,)/llv;-v n I I2, we have (1~;-v,ll/l~,(v;-0,) +m 7 which can be rewritten because of (iv), as IlhZ(pn, w;)-h2(&, w,)(l/(wk-wn)+
oo,contradicting the hypothesis that h Z is income lipschitzian.
We are ready now to prove the theorem. 6 IlpnII Ilxn -Y~II = llxn -Y~II. y,) ) +co, which contradicts Lemma 8.
<M(p,, x,) -M(p,, y,) <pn(xn-Y,)
(ii) M,-is regular on K. Suppose not, then there are x,, y, E K such that x, > y, and (M(p, x,) -M (p, y,) )/(Jx, -y,() + 0. Let E > 0 be such that p > Ee for every
Lemma 8.
EXAMPLES
A. Example 1
We will exhibit two distinct 2, Z r~P s c with h2= hZ'. Since the details are messy, it will be helpful to give first an intuitive explanation of the construction. The main idea (also to be found in Rader [16,p. 2441and attributed to L. Shapley) goes as follows: suppose one has in the plane two distinct finite families of (nonintersecting) indifference curves such that any two curves from different families either do not intersect or intersect in a tangential manner (see Figure 1) ; moreover, some couple of lines do in fact intersect. It is possible to convince oneself by inspection that there is no difficulty in adding to any of the families a new line passing through an arbitrary point and preserving the tangential intersection property. Iterating, one ends up with two families dense in the plane and it is reasonably clear that they define two distinct "nice" preference relations having the same demand function.
The construction is organized in three sections. The first carries out the iterative construction of the two families of lines; the second deals with the limiting operations; the third puts the results together. Not to be exceedingly long, many small and easy proofs shall be left out. every t E [a, a'] (or [a, a' ), etc.); f << f * stands for f <<A f *,; analogously, f sf * will mean f ( t )sf * ( t )for every t E A ;without possible confusion we shall, at tlmes, let 0 stand for the constant function with value 0.The derivative of f : A +R, A cR, at t E A, if it exists, is f'(t);in general (i.e., f : A +R", A cR m )the derivative map at x E A is denoted Df ( x ) .
Given f, f * : A + R , A cR, let f v f", f A f * : A +R be given by ( f v f*)(t)= max { f ( t ) , f*(t)), generic element of 9x 9shall be denoted ({fl,i)?l, {f2,i)?). We state the following condition (see Figure 1 ): ({ft,i}yl, {f2,i)?) E FX Xsatisfies:
(la)
for every j = 1, 2 and 16i, i' 6N,, either fiSi fi,' or fix' =fi,i'; << fi,I,or fiZi,<< (lb) for every 1a i s N1, 1si t sN2 the equation f l,i(t) =f2,i(t) has a t most one solution ; (lc) for every 1si sN1, 1si ' s N2, 0 si s 1, fl,i(j) =fz,i,(i) implies f ;,,(I) = f h,i,(i>.
Note that, for every I s i sN1, 1s i t s N2, f l , i v f2,i'E Fe and f1.i A f2,i'E Fe.
We will need the following fact. With every eight-tuple (al, a2, bl, b2, cl, c2, gl, g 2 )~ satisfying:
O s a l < a 2 s1, bl<b2,gl<< g 2 , g l ( a t ) s b t sgz(at),gl(a2)s b2sg2(a2); (2b) for every al < t <a2, g2(t) >max {bt +cl(t -al), b~+ c z ( t -ad}; See Figure 2 . We skip the proof of this assertion (which, details aside, is obvious).
We now show the following: For j = 1 , 2 there are functions Tj:9X 9X E +Fe such that if ({ft,i}?', {f2,i}? E 9 X 9 satisfies (1) and y E E, then letting fi = Tj({fl,i>?', {f2,i}Nz, Y), ( 4 4 fi(yt)=y2; (4b) if j = 1(resp.j = 2), ({fl,i}?' u{fl}, {f2,i}? (resp. ({fl,i}Y1, {f2,i}Fu{f21)) satisfies (1).
See Figure 1 .
PROOF: By symmetry, it suffices to prove that !PIexists. The problem reduces to exhibiting a set of rules such that for any ({fl,i}?l, {f2,i}?) E 9X satisfying (1) a unique f E Fe is obtained such that f(y l) = and ({fl,i}Y'u{f}, {f2,i}?) satisfies (1). Take an arbitrary y E E and ({f l,i}?', {f2,i}p) E 9x 9 for which (1) holds. Let f1,0=f2,0=0, f i ,~~+ 1 = f 2 ,~~+ 1 .~f~,~, +~, = q ;we can assume f l ,~s f l ,~s . . f2,0s f 2 , t s . .isf2,~2+1. For Some 1~j i~N i , f t , j l ( y 1 )~y 2~f t , j l + t ( y 1 ) ; if y ' = f~,~, (~' ) (resp. y =f:,jl+l(y ')) take f =f l j 1(resp. f =fl,j,+l). From now on suppose that fl,j1(y < Y <fl.jl+l(yt). Let f~, j~( y~) s~~s f2,j2+1(~'), 1sj 2 s N2, and denote gi =f2,i if i sj2, gi+l =f2,i if i 2j2+ 1 (hence, gj+2 is not defined). Take m l = m a~{ i : g~< < f l ,~~+ l and gi(y1)<y2), m2=j2+1, m3=min{i:gi>>fl,jl and gi(y ') > '); clearly, ml Q mL-1, m3 a m 2 + 1. Let J = f i v gml, f =fl,jl+l A gm3; jl then f<< f and, of course, f;fE Fe. Define the symbols:
By the hypothesis and the definition of f; f the followirig two cases are exhaustive and mutually exclusive (see Figure 3) : (i) gi (0) af(0) for every ml si s m2-1 a n d g i ( l ) s f ( l ) f o r e v e r y m 2 + 1 s i s m 3 ; (ii) m 3 > m l + 2 , g i ( l ) a f ( l ) for every ml Q i Q m2-1 and gi(0) s f ( 0 ) for every m2 +1si sm3.
We construct now the function f for case (i); case (ii) is entirely parallel. Q.E.D.
Let {y,)';" be a countable dense subset of E = {y E R ' :. 0 < y l < 1, 0 <y 2 < cp (yl)). For the rest of this and the next two sections the set {y,)2=l shall remain fixed; we assume yl = (4,2).
We make the following claim: There are two sequences f 1,,, f2,, E Fe, 1S n < oo, such that (5a) for every n, n' and j = 1,2, eitherf;.,, << fi,,, orf;.,,'<<A, , , orf;.,,, =f;.,n ;
(5b) for every n,fl,, ( PROOF: This is an obvious consequence of (4). In two initial steps choose for fl,r, f2,1, respectively, two arbitrary distinct functions gl, g2€ Fe such that gl(+) = (ii) Z is continuous: Let x, +x, v, + v, x, 2 v,. Suppose that for some z E A, VEU,, x&U,. Take z',z"EA such that x<<z'<czU and zU&U,, then U, c U,,,c intnU,, (by (6a-c)). Therefore, for some E,vEE U,, and xE& U,,, which contradicts x,-Z vz. Hence x k v.
(iii) Z is monotone: Let z >>x, x E 0. Pick v E A such that x << v << z. Then z E U,, but x& U, (if x E U,, then v E intnU,, which is impossible by (6b)), hence Z >X.
(iv) (6f) holds: Let z E Ux, x E A ;if x E U,, v E A, then z E U, (by (6a-c)); hence . .,xi-')).
Given any Z E 9define 2"by x 2"v if and only if @x Z &I (see Figure 4) . It is immediate that 2'"is a continuous, monotone, preference relation; moreover:
If Z satisfies (6g), then Z * is strictly convex, i.e., k * E PSc.
PROOF: Pick 2 E 0 and let k = @(f). Since (6g) holds, there is a convex g: R:-' + R such that v 2 f and k Z v if and only if v' =g(vl, . . . , vi-'). Therefore v' 2"2 and 2 2"v' if and only if v" = g(vl',. . . ,vfi-') +A(vfl, . . . ,vfi-').
Since g +A is a strictly convex function and f is arbitrary, 2*is strictly convex (see Figure 4) . Q.E.D. If 2 E 9 ' satisfies (6g) and x E int 0 , then u(z*, x) = p ( u ( 2 , @x)
x {@XI).
We show now:
(10) L e t A c~b e d e n s e a n d k 1 , k 2~~. I f u ( k 1 ,~) = u ( k 2 , x ) f o r e v e r y x E A, then u ( k l , x) = u ( k 2 , X) for every x E 0 .
PROOF: It is well known (see, for example, Mas-Cole11 [13, (1.14)]) that for every 2 E P, u ( k , .) as a correspondence on 0 is upper hemicontinuous. Therefore, for every x € 0 , u ( z l , x ) n u ( z 2 , x)# 0 and, as a consequence, V(Z1, x) u V(k2, x') is convex, for every x, X ' E 0 ' . Let p ~u ( k~, x € 0 . Take any z € 0 such that pz <px. Then, x), [z, x ] c V(kl, x) u V(k2, 2); by hypothesis [z, x ] n V(Z1, x) = 0 ; therefore, [z, x) c V(k2,y ) and so x E V(k2,z);by monotonicity z @ V(k2, x). Hence p E 4 2 2 , XI.
SECTION 3: All the pieces for the construction of the example are now available. Let fl,,, fi,, be two sequences of f~n c t i o n s~a s the ones whose existence is asserted in (5) . Denote (see Figure 5 ) 
andxl>l"). 
The families {u;: x E A ) , j = l , 2 , satisfy every one of the conditions in (6).
Therefore, if we define k j ,j = 1,2 by x Z j v if, for every z E A , v E U<implies x E u',,we have k jE 9, j = 1,2, and, consequently, by (7) ,27 E j = 1,2. We This completes the construction of the example. As described the preference relations obtained may not have smooth hypersurfaces but it should be clear that with some further transformations they could be taken to be so. This is an example of a monotone, continuous, convex preference relation generating income lipschitzian demand functions and not possessing any concave utility representation. In fact, in the example there is a point such that no utility function can be concave in a neighborhood of that point. For simplicity the example is given for 1= 2 and the preference relation involved is not strictly concave; with some additional work it can be made strictly convex.
Let cp : [O, oo) +[0, oo) be the function obtained by linear extension given the values cp(0)=0, cp(l)=l, cp(l+(l/n))=l+(l/n) for n 2 1 , cp(~(l+(l/(n+1)))+i(1+(l/n)))=i(1+(l/(n+1))+6(1+(l/n))) for rial, cp (t)= t for t 2 2 (see Figure 6 ).On R:, 2 is the preference relation represented by the utility function v(x) = min {p(xl), x2) (which, incidentally, is lipschitzian and, with the qualification of Remark 7, regular).
Suppose there was a concave utility function u : R +R representing 2. Let y = (l,2), x = (1, I), y, = (1+( l l n ) , 2+ (lln)), x, = (1+(lln), 1+(lln)). Then, Hence, denoting by y ( z ) the directional derivative of u at z E R in the direction (1, I),
Since y(yZ) has to be positive (monotonicity) y (y,) +a, which is impossible, given the concavity of u. The same argument shows that no concave function exists representing k in a neighborhood of (1, 1).
Clearly, h k is income lipschitzian; in fact, the example can be easily modified (smooth out the corners of cp) to yield a differentiable demand function; possibly, a more complicated modification would yield a continuously differentiable one.
C. Example 3
This is an example of a continuous, monotone 2 representable by a concave utility function and generating a demand function which is not income lipschitzian. Again, for ease of description, 1 = 2 and 2 will not be strictly convex. It is easy to modify the example to get strict convexity.
Let a (m): [O, m) +R be the curve defined by (see Figure 7 ): ~e t T CR~be ~= { a l ( m ) , a2(m), (a'(m)+a2(m))*: O S m <oo).Defineaconcave, continuous, increasing function u :R +R by u(x) = sup {v E R : (x, v ) E co ( T +(0x (0))). Then the preference relation Z represented by u is such that for p1 =p2, h2(p1, p2, .) = a (s) and, therefore, h z is not income lipschitzian at p 1 = P 2 = 1 , ~= 2 ( s e e F i g u r e 7 ) .
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